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IN RECENT months many observers in the finan-
cial community have been concerned about the po-
tential emergence of a credit crunch. Last fall, eco-
nomic forecasters indicated that the occurrence of
such a crunch was a major potential blight on an
otherwise optimistic outlook for 1973. In many re-
spects the economic conditions anticipated in 1973
were viewed as being similar to those which prevailed
in 1966 and 1969, two recent years of widespread
financial stress. Strong real output growth, high levels
of capacity utilization, and advancing price pressures
were experienced in those years and were projected
to reemerge in 1973.
In 1966 and 1969, the accelerating inflationary pres-
sures led stabilization authorities to take restrictive
measures in order to restrain the upward spiral of
prices. A side effect of those efforts was the creation
in 1966 and 1969 of conditions in the financial markets
which became popularly characterized as a “credit
crunch.”
This article reviews characteristics common to the
two credit crunch periods, and then examines finan-
cial and business conditions in early 1973. The differ-
ences and similarities between the earlier periods and
developments so far in 1973 are emphasized. Cur-
rently, there are strong credit demands in the econ-
omy, as there were in the 1966 and 1969 credit
crunch periods. However, substantial differences be-
tween the present and earlier periods remain.
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CIIARACTERISTICS OF’ THE
CREDIT CRUNC1IE~SoF 1966 TEl) 1969
The term “crunch” is indicative of developments
wherein rapidly changing supply and demand forces,
in combination with non-market interest regulations,
sharply alter the flow of credit away from normal
channels- This distortion of normal credit flows was
the clearest single element common to both the 1966
and 1969 credit crunches.1 Credit seekers who were
affected by the change in flows included business
firms, governments, individuals, and financial
institutions.
Sectors Most Advcrscjr, Affected
In the past two crunch periods, certain financial
institutions were among the most publicized victims
of the financial wrenching. Since financial intermedi-
aries obtain funds from savers and extend loans to
borrowers, they are particularly vulnerable to pro-
nounced changes in credit flows. In both crunch situa-
tions, these institutions were “disintermediated” when
the rates they were permitted to pay savers did not
rise as rapidly as interest rates in the open market.
For a while the intermediaries were able to meet a
continued high demand for funds by liquidating short-
term securities or by borrowing. Eventually, however,
1
Some of these distortions continued into the immediately
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they were forced to curb loan extensions because of
the inability to attract new funds.
Individuals and firms seeking to obtain funds from
institutions whose borrowing rates were subject to
legal ceilings probably found the available supply of
credit allocated on a non-price basis — first come, first
served, for example. In cases in which ceilings on
interest rates did not exist or were ineffective, the
price mechanism functioned to allocate the credit
supply. Some borrowers likely found the prices they
had to pay for credit were sufficiently high as to dis-
courage them from borrowing at that time. If they
anticipated the cost of credit would fall sometime
later relative to their expected return (however incas-
ured), they simply postponed attempts to obtain
funds. Such actions would tend to lower tile immedi-
ate demand pressure on financial intermediaries.
Sources of funds to financial intermediaries at any
time are strongly influenced by changes in the interest
rates that the intermediaries are permitted to pay to
attract deposits. The ability of one intermediary to
attract deposits from another by an incremental in-
crease in offering rates has probably been enhanced
during periods of financial stress. High open market
rates likely caused some disintermediation among all
the thrift institutions. One result was increased bor-
rowing on the part of the intermediaries.
Member banks increased borrowing from the Fed-
eral Reserve Banks, and savings and loan associations
turned to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. In
some cases the Federal Reserve chose to restrict bank
borrowing at the given discount rate, and the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board encountered exceptionally
high costs in marketing its own securities on the open
market. These actions contributed to the crunch situa-
tion for those banks and savings and loans deprived
of a large part of both their primnary and secondary
sources of funds.
The housing sector was also greatly influenced by
these financial developments. With savings and loan
associations, mutual savings banks, and commercial
banks forced to curb the advance of housing loans,
Federal or semi-Federal agencies such as the Federal
National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA)
attempted to make available to the housing sector
funds that they had been able to attract on the open
market. The agency support was particularly signifi-
cant to the housing sector at timnes when the mortgage
activity of life insurance companies had been curbed
because of the large volume of policy loans granted
to policyholders. The relatively low interest charge
set in the insurance contracts made this source of
funds quite attractive to individuals and firms.
Most state and local governments are subject to sub-
stantial constraints on their capacity to obtain funds
through bond issuance or tax increases. Like some
financial intermediaries and high risk borrowers, many
of these governments have curbed their operations
during periods of financial stress. The Federal Gov-
ernment, on the other hand, is less limited in its
ability to tax and/or issue bonds when it desires to
obtain additional funds. In fact, this ability to borrow
from the public at high interest rates (at least in the
short-term market) at times has likely resulted in a
shift of funds from financial intermediaries and state
and local governments to the Federal Government.
.Deve!oprnerit or the Credit Crunches
Ironically, the origins of past credit crunch periods
may be traced to stimulative monetary policy actions.
Expansionary policies have been appropriately taken
during recessionary periods to stimulate real eco-
nomic activity. However, in periods when economic
activity is already moving at a brisk pace, and re-
source utilization is very high, monetary stimulus may
eventually precipitate a credit crnnch.
The demand for funds in such periods has been
sufficient to induce a rise in interest rates. Frequently,
monetary authorities have resisted tile rise in market
interest rates by stepping up the pace at which they
supplied reserves to the banking system. The increases
in reserves have led to expanded flows of credit, in-
creased growth in the money stock, and temporary
reductions in or a leveling off of interest rates.
Increased growth in money, relative to the prevail-
ing trend, has led to increases in the growth of total
spending. The rise in the pace of spending has been
accompanied by increases in the demand for credit,
and, simultaneously, upward interest rate pressures.
Advances in the growth of total spending that have
occurred at relatively high levels of employment have
been accompanied by greater inflationary pressures.
To the extent that price increases come to be antici-
pated, lenders deniand and borrowers are willing to
pay still higher interest rates. Only when some out-
side source of funds, such as the Federal Reserve
Banks, has continued to supply credit at an accelerat-
ing rate has financial stress been postponed. The cost
of such postponement has been escalating inflation.
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However, at some point in the inflation cycle, the
monetary authorities have undertaken restrictive ac-
tions. These actions have been reflected in a slowing
in the rate of growth of monetary aggregates and a
temporary further rise in interest rates, both of which
occurred in 1966 and 1969. Subsequently, as a result
of the restrictive policy actions, credit extensions have
fallen and interest rate declines have accompanied a
slowing in the pace of total spending.
The credit crunch periods were significant not only
because of the financial wrenchings which occurred
at that time, but also because such periods were fol-
lowed by a slowing in real economic activity. The
credit crnnch of 1966 was followed by the mini-re-
cession of 1967, and the crunch of 1969 preceded the
recession of 1970. Current business conditions and
financial developments suggest some similarities with
these earlier periods, but the differences are signifi-
cant and notable.
COMPARISON OF BUSINESS AND
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
As in 1986 and 1969, total spending, output, and
employment indicators currently reflect a rapid
growth in economic activity. A brief slowing in cer-
tain monetary aggregates, and a rise in some interest
rates resemble patterns observed in 1966 and 1969.
However, important differences remain.
Soending, Output, and Prices
Rising prices and increased growth of real output
are associated with growing credit demands. In the
early recovery stage of the business cycle, output tends
to rise rapidly while the inflation rate changes slowly.
Thus, credit demands at this stage are associated pri-
madly with output gains as businesses borrow to
finance plant and equipment expansion and inventory
building, and consumers borrow to finance increased
purchases. In the latter stage of a recovery, further
increases in output are more difficult to achieve be-
cause resources are more highly utilized. However,
credit demands continue to rise as price advances
tend to accelerate and anticipations of further infla-
tion continue to build.
In early 1973, both real output and prices have
risen rapidly. A deceleration in the rate of increase of
many prices, which began in late 1970, was reversed
late last year. At •the same time, the sharp pickup in
real output, which began at the end of 1971, has con-
tinued into early 1973. The associated gains in total
spending have been at rates above those which pre-
vailed in the 1966 and 1969 credit crunch years.
A 13.1 percent annual rate of advance of total
spending in the two-quarter period ending in March
this year surpassed all other two-quarter gains since
1951. It is not clear, however, that the credit demand
pressures created by such rapid price and output ad-
vances are any greater than those which prevailed in
1966 and 1969. Some observers argue that growth in
credit demands is not based solely on the price and
output movements in the present and immediate past,
but also on those which have occurred over time.2
The 1966 and 1969 credit experiences were preceded
by longer periods of output and price build-ups than
have developed since the rather sluggish recovery
year of 1971.
Moneiary Aggregates
The fact ‘that some interest rates recently have been
rising while a slowing in the rate of growth of the
money stock has also occurred has led some observers
to conclude that the monetary authorities have
adopted a highly restrictive policy stance. Other evi-
dence indicates that such a conclusion might be
premature.
The accompanying chart of the narrowly defined
money stock (M1) indicates that money stock growth
slowed sharply from its earlier trend for extended
periods of time in 1966 and 1969, In fact, the money
supply did not increase at all from April 1966 to
January 1967. In both cases the slowing lasted for at
least nine months.
Money stock growth in early 1973 has decelerated
from the 7.2 percent annual rate of increase from
fourth quarter 1970 to fourth quarter 1972. During
the six-month period from November last year to May
1973, the money stock rose at a 6.4 percent annual
rate, only slightly less than the 1970-72 rate.3 The
slowing which occurred in 1966 and 1969, by way of
contrast with the recent period of deceleration, repre-
‘The St. Louis Model, for example, features a short-term
interest rate equation in which price and output changes are
lagged over a tea-quarter period and a long-term interest
rate equation in which price and output changes are lagged
over a sixteen-quarter period. See Leonall C. Andersen and
Keith M. Carlson, “A Moaetnrist Model for Economic Sta-
bilization,” this Review (April 1970), pp. 14-15.
“The money stock rose at an abnommlly high 14.1 percent
rate from Noveoiher 1972 to 1)ecember and declined at a
0.5 percent rate from Decemher 1972 to January. The
choice of November avoids the distortion introduced into
rates of change calculations from abaorinal base periods such
as December or January.
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sented a sharp decline from the prevailing trend rates.
Moreover, the slowing in the growth of money in 1973
has occurred over fewer months than in 1966 and
1969.
The accompanying chart also indicates that the
movements of money stock plus net time deposits
(M2) have been similar to those of M1 over approxi-
mately the same periods. A marked and sustained
slowing in M2 growth occurred in 1966 and 1969, but
the slowing thus far in 1973 is neither so pronounced
nor so prolonged. From an annual rate of increase of
11 percent in the 1970-72 period, M2 growth slowed
to an 8.6 percent rate of increase in the six months
ending in May 1973
The Federal Reserve does not exercise absolute
control over either M1 or M2 in the short run. The
behavior of the public, commercial banks, and the
Treasury also affect monetary growth. Over a longer
period, the growth of money is dominated by changes
in the monetary base, the uses of which are bank
reserves and currency in the hands of the public.4
The monetary base slowed markedly in 1966 and
1969 in a pattern roughly comparable with that of
both M1 and M2. From November 1972 to May 1973,
however, growth of the monetary base did not slow.
4
See Leonall C. Andersen and Jerry L. Jordan, “TIse Mone-
tary Base — Explanation and Analytical Use,” this Review
(August 1968), pp. 7-11
The base increased at an 8 percent annual rate in the
six-month period ending in May, compared with a
7.8 percent rate of increase in the preceding two years.
Largely because of the continued increase in the
monetary base in recent months, there is a strong
possibility ‘that the recent slowing in money growth
was a temporary result of the irregular and unusual
pattern of Treasury deposits, and the recent sharp
rise in large negotiable certificates of deposit (CDs)
Thus, changes in the rate of growth of the monetary
base do not support the view that the monetary au-
thorities have recently adopted a strongly restrictive
stance.
5
Unusual Treasury deposit flows accounted for much of the
abnormal rise in the money stock in December 1972 and
the subsequent slowing in the early mouths of this year. In
December, the Treasury man down its balances at commercial
banks while making the initial revenue sharing payments to
state and local governments. Demand deposit balances of
the Federal Government, unlike the balances of state and
local governments, are not counted as part of the money
stock.
In early 1973, Treasury deposit balances at commercial
banks rose more rapidly than usual because of continued
overwithholding on the part of the public and the Treasury’s
relatively slow pace in meeting the large volume of tax re-
funds. Two other factors which contributed to a slo~vingin
the rate of growth of the money stock, but which had no
effect on the monetary base, ~vere a rapid rise in the growth
of commercial bank certificates of deposit and an increase
in the demand for currency relative to demand deposits.
The growth in CDs, which absorbs reserves otherwise avail-
able for private demand deposits, is attributable in part to
the relatively low commercial bank prime loan rates com-
pared to rates available to corporate borrowers in the com-
mercial paper market. To meet the increased loan demand,
banks bid aggressively for CD funds.
Money Stock and Money Stock Plus Net lime Deposits Monetary Base and Federal Reserve Credit
iSO ~Hi—~ jr r~’h~H~ so
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Federal Reserve credit and reserves available to
support private nonbank deposits, two additional
measures of monetary actions, also have grown more
rapidly this year than in the two preceding years. In
1966 and 1969 both measures slowed substantially
from their prevailing trends.
Lnt.erest States
One significant characteristic of a credit crunch
situation is the upward movement of various interest
rates, The rise in open market interest rates above
legal rate ceilings was one of the clearest common
elements in the disintermediation of financial inter-
mediaries in 1966 and 1969.
Market interest rates, which reflect demands for
and supplies of credit, have risen sharply in recent
months. Increases in interest rates since December
1972 have been particularly marked for short-term
funds. In the first five months of this year, three-month
Treasury bill rates have increased 129 basis points,
four- to six-month commercial paper rates 182 basis
points, and corporate Aaa bond rates 21 basis points.
The levels of the short-term rates are currently near
the level of the long-term Aaa corporate bond rate.
At 7.36 percent in the first week of June, the bond rate
was 29 basis points above the Treasury bill rate and
47 basis points below the commercial paper rate.
In only two instances in the 1960-72 period did the
commercial paper rate rise above the long-term bond
rate. The two periods spanned January 1966 through
March 1967 and April 1969 through May 1970. The
commercial paper rate rose well above the long-term
rate on each of those occasions, reaching a peak of
65 basis points above the corporate bond rate in the
first instance (November 1966) and 157 basis points
in the second (July 1969). Thus, although the com-
mercial paper rate in early June was high relative to
the Aaa corporate bond rate, the differential was not
as great as in the past credit crunch periods.
SF~CTORALACTIVITY
The sharp rise in open market short-term rates has
begun to affect financial intermediaries whose admin-
istered rates have risen more slowly. Governmental
and foreign influences on U.S. interest rates will be of
particular significance over the next several months.
Ia;nan.ei.atlnterinedia i•es
Commercial banks and other savings institutions are
among the first to be affected by financial stress.
(Tommrroiel Benks — As the initial commercial in-
stitution through which monetary actions are re-
flected, commercial banks played an important role in
the credit crunch periods. For the most part, recent
commercial bank data suggest only minor similarities
with developments in earlier periods of credit stress.
For example, instead of slowing as in 1966 and 1969,
large commercial bank certificates of deposit accel-
erated from a 32.3 percent increase in the 1970-72
period to a rate in excess of 100 percent in the first
five months of 1973. The rapid rise in CDs in recent
years was facilitated by the removal of interest ceil-
ings on 30-89 day CDs in June 1970. Ceilings were
removed from all CDs of $100,000 or more in May
1973.
Bank credit, which consists of loans and invest-
mnents, slowed markedly in 1966 and 1969. In the first
five months of 1973, bank credit increased at a 16.9












asset-liability positions are trans-
other areas, such as the housing
hOver time, bank credit and the money stock tend to move in
a sinsilar pattern. In some short periods, as in early 1973, this
tendency has not been observed. When there is a rise in the
interest rate that banks arc pcrasittcd to pay on certificates of
deposit, banks are able to extend additional credit even if
bank reserves are held constant, .‘~ given amount of hank
reserves supports far moore certificates of deposit (CDs) than
demand deposits because of the much lower reserve require-
ments for CDs. (A marginal reserve requirement of 8 per-
cent on increased holdings of large CDs ‘vas recently im-
posed.) Large CDs, however, arc rarely considered money.
The rise in one component of bank liabilities ( CDs ) is ac—
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Business Loans, Certificates of Deposit,
and Commercial Paper Volume
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Most of the recent gains in bank credit have been
in the form of loans, particularly business loans. Be-
cause prime business loan rates have been restrained
somewhat by the Committee on Interest and Divi-
dends, bank loans have been a relatively attractive
source of funds to largebusiness firms. In fact, in view
of the difference in interest rates on bank loans to
businesses and the yields available on large CDs, it is
likely that large business finns increased both their
outstanding loans from banks and their holdings of
CDs.
The fact that most of the recent advances in bank
credit have been accounted for by increases in loans,
rather than securities, is in aceord with 1966, 1969
developments! In 1966 and 1969 security holdings of
banks declined for several months as banks sought to
accommodate loan demand. In the five-month period
ending in May 1973, bank security holdings remained
unchanged, compared with a 9 percent rise in the
preceding year.
companied by a fall its another ( demand deposits or time
deposits other than CDs). Thus, a short-term change in the
asix of bank liabilities may result in a rise in bank credit and
a decline in the money supply
7
Sincc the current period is not one of financial stress m,f tile
nature observed in 1966 and 1969, the rapid expansion of
loans relative to securities reflects, in part, the relatively’ low
prime bank loan rate of rccent months. In early June 1973,
a prime bank loan rate of 7.5 percent svas about 33 basis
points below the commercial paper rate, compared with an
average of almost 50 basis points above in 1972.
Banks probably find it profitable in the long run to
continue making loans to their better customers in
times of financial stress rather than extending credit
to other sectors such as the Government security
market. In other words, rates of return on loans
(measured to include long-mn considerations) in high
interest rate periods surpass tise yields on securities,
State and local government securities are at a particu-
lar disadvantage in such times because of the statu-
tory ceilings on yields of their bond issues.
Business loans have accounted for much of the in-
crease in bank loans in early 1973. These loans in-
creased at a 34.4 percent annual rate in the first five
months of ‘this year, compared with about an 11 per-
cent rise in the preceding twelve months. Real estate
loans have slowed in early 1973 from their rapid rate
of increase in 1972, while, consumer loan growth has
picked up somewhat. Consumer debt of all sorts is
currently quite high, perhaps reflecting an optimistic
income and employment outlook and/or a desire to
“beat” future inflation.
NT~nba.n.k Financial Institutions — After enjoying
two excellent years in terms cf deposit gains in 1971
and 1972, savings and loan associations and mutual
savings banks appear to have experienced somewhat
less success in early 1973. The recent rise in open
market interest rates has probably contributed to the
slowing in deposits at both institutions from a 17 per-
cent increase in the year ending in December 1972
to a 12 percent annual rate of increase in the first
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In 1966 and 1969, the ability of tlse small saver to
purchase a high-yielding Treasury bill by withdraw-
ing as little as $1,000 from a savings and loan or
mutual savings bank account likely was associated
with the marked slowing in deposits at nonbank
thrift institutions in those two years (see chart). In
March 1970, original Treasury security issues in less
than $10,000 denominations were discontinued. As a
result, the small saver is now less likely to withdraw
his institutional savings during hmgh interest rate pe-
riods. More wealthy individuals and firms can still
easily switch assets in accord with changing open
market interest rates. The ability of the savings inter-
mediaries to retain these accounts was enhanced in
1970 by the relaxation of interest rate ceilings on cer-
tain large deposits. In May 1973 interest restrictions
on savings certificates of $100,000 or more were re-
moved for most savings and loan associations.
As an indication that the savings institutions are
experiencing some changes in their savings flow posi-
tions, the withdrawal ratio (withdrawals relative to
new savings) at savings and loan associations rose to
an average of 74 percent in the first four months of
1973, compared with 64 percent over the same period
in 1972. This ratio averaged 92 percent in both 1966
and 1989.
Savings and loan borrowings, primarily from the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), have
also begun to increase, although not nearly as much
as in 1986 or 1969. The FHLBB, in turn, may issue
more of its own securities on the open market, as it
did in the two earlier crunch years, in order -to meet
the demand for funds by savings and loan associa-
tions. Desired borrowings by the associations depends,
in part, on the demand for housing — a demand which
probably has begun to slow.
As with the nonbank thrift institutions, business
corporations are expected to require some increases
in funds from credit markets this year. A June 1973
Comnme-rce Department survey reported that business-
men expected to increase plant and equipment out-
lays in 1973 by 13.2 percent (compared with an 8.9
percent rise in 1972 and 1.9 percent in 1971). The
spring survey of the McGraw-Hill Company found a
planned increase in such outlays of 19 percent in 1973,
These sizable increases in the demand for plant and
equipment are anticipated because of obsolesence of
many of the older facilities, the current strength of
the economy, and new environmental and safety con-
trol regulations. Under some circumstances, it might
be expected that the resultant demands for corporate
credit would generate considerable interest rate pres-
sures, but many business firms are currently in a
position to handle much of their planned new invest-
ment with internal funds.
Corporate cash flow, which includes undistributed
profits and capital consump’tion allowances, has in-
creased as a result of the recent changes in deprecia-
tion rules, the re-introduction of the investment tax
credit, and the 4 percent ceiling on dividend in-
creases, as well as the greater corporate income that
has accompanied the current economic expansion.
Corporate liquidity (liquid assets relative to current
liabilities) is also relatively abundant.
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Some upward pressure on short-term commercial
paper interest rates may develop in 1973 if the prime
bank loan rate is permitted to move to its market-
determined level. With a substantial rise in bank inter-
est rates, firms financing expected inventory gains
would turn from bank borrowing to relatively greater
issuance of commercial paper.
Governmental and Fo-re-ign Sectors
The governmental and fo-reign sectors provide the
exogenous or “outsid&’ influence on U.S. credit flows.
These outside factors are probably more difficult to
gauge than others because they are subject to more
non-economic forces.
Federal Government —The Federal Government
put considerably more pressure on the financial mar-
kets in calendar year 1966, when it had a $3.8 billion
deficit (unified budget basis), than in 1969, when it
incurred a $3.2 billion surplus. The 1966 deficit was
financed largely by the sale of U.S. Government se-
curities to the private sector.
At the time, the Federal Reserve was following
restrictive policies and avoiding large Treasury se-
curity purchases. The apparent result of the Treas-
umy and Federal Reserve actions was a “crowding
out” of some private borrowers fro-m the financial
markets. In 1969 Federal Government pressures on
financial markets were much less intense, despite re-
strictive actions by the Federal Reserve.
Earlier this year a number of analysts were project-
ing substantial pressures in the Treasury security
market because of the large deficits anticipated in
1973, The issuance of a large volume of Treasury se-
curities was expected if only to facilitate refunds of
last year’s tax overwithholding. It appears, however,
that many individuals have yet to re-adjust their tax
exemption schedules, resulting in a repetition of over-
withholding in the current year. In addition, the
growth of the economy has been more robust to date
than many analysts projected. Large increases in per-
sonal and corporate incomes have resulted in greater-
than-anticipated tax receipts.°Deficit estimates were
recently revised downward from $24.8 billion in fiscal
1973 and $12.7 billion in fiscal 1974 to $17.8 billion
and $2.7 billion, respectively.0
t
Sales of special securities to foreign governments around the
time of the currency crisis in early’ 1973 also contributed to
the Government’s favorable cash position.
4
lnltial data are from the 1973 Report of the Council of
Economic Advisers, and the revised estimates were taken
from the “Mid-Session Review of the 1974 Budget,” Office
of Management and Budget, June 1, 1973.
State and Local Governments — There is consider-
able evidence that the ability of state and local gov-
ernments to attract funds in 1966 and 1969 was
adversely affected by the prevailing financial pres-
sures.1°Bond issuance was postponed in a number of
eases until interest rates returned to more nonnal
levels. To the extent that these governments did not
“drop out of the market,” however, they themselves
tended to aggravate interest rate pressures.
Since mid-1969, state and local governments in the
aggregate have been incurring budget surpluses. The
recent implementation of Federal revenue sharing
and the strength of economic activity are currently
bolstering these governments’ financial positions. It is
probable that some state and local governments have
been using portions of their heavy inflow of funds to
purchase Treasury bills, thereby keeping yields on
Treasury securities below what they otherwise would
be.
Foreign Sector — Under certain conditions in the
past, such as an expanded balance-of-payments sur-
plus which resulted in a rise in U.S. gold receipts and
an associated increase in the- monetary base (not
otherwise offset), foreign sector developments un-
ambiguously influenced the volume of U.S. credit
flows. In many other eases the foreign influence is not
so clear.
At present, for example, foreigners hold slightly less
than 19 percent of U.S. Government securities out-
standing (net of debt held by U.S. Government agen-
cies and trust funds), much of which was accumu-
lated by foreign central banks during the international
monetary turmoil of the past two years. To the extent
that foreign central banks sell a portion of their ap-
proximately $63 billion of U.S. Treasury securities in
the near future, the effect would add to upward pres-
sure on interest yields of these securities.tm’
A sale of this scope would not likely occur unless:
1) the interest rate on competing U.S. assets, such as
certificates of deposit issued by commercial banks,
rose well above the Treasumy security rate; or 2) U.S.
or foreign investors exchanged foreign currencies for
tmOSee John E. Petersen and Paul F. McGouldrick, “Monetary
Restraint, Borrowiag and Capital Spending by Smnall Local
Governments and State Colleges in 1966,” Federal Reserve
Bulletin (Decensher 1968), pp. 953-982, and John Ii. Peter-
sen, ‘Response of State and Local Governments to Varying




Sec Anatol Balbach, “Will Capital Refiows Induce Domestic
Interest Rate Changes?”, tlsis Reciccc (July 1972), pp. 2—5,
and Jerry L. Jordan, “Interest Rates and Monetary Growth,”
this Review (January 1973), pp. 2-11.
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dollars at the foreign central banks in order -to invest
in dollar-denominated assets such as U.S. private
bonds and equities. In either case, upward pressures
on Treasury security interest rates would be accom-
panied by an increased demand for other types of
U.S. assets.
SUMMARY
Although some similarities with earlier credit
crunch periods have been noted, the economic situa-
tion in the first five months of 1973 was far removed
from the type of intense financial pressures of 1966
and 1969. Distortions in credit flows, the chief charac-
teristic of the earlier crunch periods, have occurred.
These distortions, however, have not been as marked
as in 1966 and 1969. Modifications of interest ceilings
have permitted financial intermediaries, such as banks
and nonbank thrift institutions, -to compete more ef-
fectively for funds than in other periods of high and
rising interest rates.
The rise in interest rates last year and so far this
year appears to have resulted largely from a growing
demand for credit. The current strength of the econ-
omy and advancing price pressures underlie the ex-
pansion of credit demand. Some sectors, such as the
various agencies supporting the thrift institutions and
the mortgage market, may step up their credit de-
mands in the ensuing months, Stronger agency sup-
port and the relaxation of some interest rate restric-
tions should make the housing industry less vulnerable
to financial stress than in the past. The corporate and
governmental sectors are not expected to foster sig-
nificant financial pressures in the near future because
of their reasonably favorable credit positions.
Key monetary aggregates, such as the monetary
base, Federal Reserve credit, and commercial bank
credit have increased rapidly in recent months, un-
like the slowdowns observed in 1966 and 1969. A
slowing in the money stock occurred for a few
months in early 1973, but the slowing was not nearly
as marked nor as enduring as that which occurred
during the severe monetary restraint of 1966 and
1969, Consequently, despite strong credit demands
and rising market interest rates, -the considerable dis-
tortions in credit flows which marked the 1966 and
1969 periods were not observed in -the early months
of 1973.
JUNE 1973
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